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LEGISLATION
LIABrLITY OF THE MUNICIPALITY FOR MOB VIOLENCE.-"The King can do

no wrong" is an aphorism which has a classic but not universal 2 application.
Despite its ready acceptance by the courts of monarchical governments, this
principle was at variance with the political ideals of America and might well
have been curtailed in its scope in the democratic United States.3 Why our
jurisprudence has clung so tenaciously to a doctrine of sovereign immunity so
incongruous in a country opposed to all other monarchical doctrines has vexed
most legal commentators. 4 Yet until the pointless application of this doctrine
provokes the legislatures and courts to greater cooperative action, it will continue to deprive many individuals of the relief which is justly their due. It
is true that some erosion has taken place. The examples cover situations
where a state or municipal corporation has departed from its strict governmental functions.5 The waiver of immunity, however, in such instances has
failed to constitute an important practical concession for most courts would
hold, in a borderline case, that the act on which liability was sought to be
predicated was not corporate or proprietary but rather governmental with the
consequent exemption from suit.6 A growing awareness that the inappropriate
immunity theory should have been long since discarded finally made some
impression on the legislatures, and statutes designed to undermine the doctrine
began to appear. 7 But the courts, still under the influence of this well1. 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISu LAW (3d ed. 1927) Introd. 5; 1 HALSDuUy,
LAws or ENGLAND (2d ed. 1931) 25.
2. See 2 GooDNow, COmPARATnvE ADMIISTRATIVE LAW (1893) 161; Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort (1934-1935) 35 YALE L. J. 1; see (1935) 4 FoiuDAm L. Rzv.
514 (discussion of theory as applied to municipal corporations).
3. See Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort (1934) 20 Aj. B. A. J. 747
wherein the writer points out that this doctrine has been inflated in the United States
to a point never reached in England where it originated.
4. Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 747.
5. This doctrine is reputed to have made its first appearance in Bailey v. Mayor
of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842).
See Doddridge, Distinction between Governmental and Proriethry Functions of MIPJcipal Corporations (1925) 23 MIcn. L. Rav. 325, 333, wherein the writer discusses the
theory of such doctrine as follows: "Concisely stated: The State is sovereign, the sovereign
cannot be sued without its consent, the municipality is a mere agent of the State, q.e.d.,
the municipality cannot be sued unless the State shows its consent by legislation. But
if the municipality is acting in its proprietary capacity for the particular benefit of the
inhabitants of the locality, it is not acting as an agent of the State but is merely exercising a privilege granted by the State and therefore does not partake of the immunity
of the State."
6. In matters pertaining to the police department and the public health the immunity
from liability has been unquestioned. However, the maintenance of highways, schools,
and fire departments have also been generally held to be governmental functions. Among
the borderline cases are acts involved in the maintenance of the city waterworks, sewers
and drains, and the cleaning of streets. See Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability
in Tort (1932) 19 VA. L. REv. 97.
7. Thus the N. Y. CODE Cw. PROC. (1919) § 264, now N. Y. CT. oF CLanws Acr (1920)
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established precedent, promptly proceeded in numerous instances to devitalize
these statutes by extremely narrow interpretations.8
Statutes predicating responsibility for mob violence upon the political subdivisions of the state might be considered the first blow9 successfully struck
at the doctrine of sovereign immunity1 o Interwoven with the rationale of
such statutes" is the recognition of the mob as a psychological phenomenon.
Students of crowd action conclude that the mob, swayed by impulses alien
to its component members as individuals, behaves in a manner almost subnormal; a multitude of gross and demented emotions are released.
Le Bon,
famous author of "The Crowd," claims that in a mob conscious independent
personality vanishes, and the ideas of all persons comprising it take the same
direction.1 3 The very irrationality of mob thinking is also an essential condition of its formation. Perhaps it was a recognition of the unreasoning and
mechanical character of the actions of the rioters which induced the legislatures to create the fixed financial responsibility of the municipality as a
substitute for the illusory liability of the mob.
§ 12 conferred upon the' Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine a private
claim against the state.
8. The effect of the provision was rendered partially nugatory by Smith v. State,
227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841 (1920) which decided that the state had waived its immunity from suit, but ndt from liability for the torts of its officers or servants.
9. Borchard, supra note 4.
Although the doctrine of dual capacity of the municipal corporation is reputed to
have made its first appearance around the same period as these statutes (supra note 5),
statutes giving private claimants a general judicial remedy against the sovereign did not
appear in New York until 1919 [N. Y. CODE CIV. PRoc. (1919) § 264, now N. Y. CT. or
C.A= Acr (1920) § 12J while the mob violence statute (aside from its existence in
England before the revolution) arose in New York in 1855.
10. It has been pointed out that new countries sparsely settled do not early develop
riotous tendencies and that it was not until the centralization of population in large
cities toward the middle of the 19th century that riots became prevalent. These conditions have been assigned as the basis of the appearance of these statutes at such . time.
See Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397, 419 (1879).
11. Statutes affording damages for personal injuries only: Mdn-nz. STAr. (Bason, 1927)
§§ 10036-10037; NEB. Coi. STAT. (1929) § 26-601-26-609; N. C. CODE Aaa;. (BMichle,
1935) § 3945; On-o CODE A_ TN. (Page, 1931) §§ 6278-6288; W. VA. Orrzcx.
CODE (1931)

§

61-6-12.

Statutes affording damages for property injury only: CAL. Por. CODE (Deering, 1931)
33 4452-4456; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 8; L . Gsr-.. SruT. (Dart, 1932) § 5369; ME.
Rnv. STAT. (1930) c. 134, §§ 19, 20. ,ID.
ANn. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 82 § 1-3; Mss.
ANNr. LAws (Lawyers Co-op., 1933) c. 269, §§ 1, 2, 3, 8; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 32713274; MoNr. REv. CODE A'4n. (Choate, 1921) § 5086; N. Y. Gm. Ml . L.wv (1909) § 71;
R. I. GEY. LAws (1923) § 6055; UrAn REv. STAT. AN. (1933) § 104-2-26, subd. 6.
Statutes affording damages for injuries to person and property: Cosa;. Gm. STAT. (1930)
§ 514; Irm. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 38, §§ 537, 540, 541, 543, 544, 545, $48; KA. REv.
STr. A T.(1923) c. 89, § 33; N. J. Coi. STAT. (Supp. 1924) tit. 130, §§ 1, 4, 5; PA. STAT.
Ay. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 16, §§ 3921, 3922, 3923, 3925, tit. 18, §§ 337, 339, 340; S.C.
CoIsr. art. 6, § 6; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 1384-1386; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 66.07.
12. Comri Am Coiams, PSycHOLOGy, (1927) 130.
13.
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The liability of such political subdivisions for mob violence exists only by
virtue of statutory enactment. 14 Since the origins of such legislation are rooted
so deeply in English legal history,1 it would seem that it should have crossed
the Atlantic as part of our heritage of English common law. Yet despite
this country's abhorrence of all things monarchical, for some unexplained reason, it clung to the maxim "The King can do no wrong"' 0 and allowed no
suit for mob violence as a common law right. Such legislation even now
exists in only half the states,' 7 and few of these have been willing to afford
indemnity for both personal and property injuries.' 8 So completely have
such statutes been considered a legislative gift that it has been held that the
right to indemnity may be divested even after the individual has proceeded to
judgment. 19
The underlying theory of such statutes is that it is the duty of the political
subdivision of the state to preserve the peace and to protect the property of
all the persons within its limits.20 As a practical matter, the statute effects
a system of insurance. The municipality, as insurer, upon the happening
of the stipulated risk (mob violence) becomes liable 2 ' for the loss suffered by
14. No relief existed at common law; failure to prevent riots and maintain the peace
was merely a lapse of governmental duty involving no pecuniary liability. Glanfortone v.
New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64 (E. D. La. 1894); Prather v. Lexington, 52 Ky. 559 (1852);
Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio 375 (1861); see DLoN, MumNacn,, CoaroRATIoNg
(5th ed. 1911) § 1636n. Likewise the city or county was not liable for the misfeasance
or non-feasance of its police. Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 Ala. 527 (1875); Jolly's Adm'x
v. Hawesville, 89 Ky. 279, 125 S. W. 313 (1889); See DmLLoN, id.
15. See 1 REEvES, HIsTORY or ENcGLms LAW (2d ed. 1787) 17 which points out that
Canute, the Dane amerced the vill and hundred for the death of a Dane whose slayer
had escaped. See POLLOCK AND MATrLAND, HIsTORY or ExGsu LAW (2d ed. 1898) 588.
Coming down to the reign of the Norman kings, the British Parliament enacted the Statute
of Winchester, in 1285, making the hundred liable for robberies committed within its
borders in case the robbers were not produced. This was followed by the statute of 27
ELz. (1585) c. 13, § 2 providing for an assessment of such damages on all the inhabitants
of the hundred. The principle that the civil subdivision charged with the duty of protecting property was liable to the individual for its failure to preserve peace and order
was, continued in the statute of 1 Gxo. I (1714) c. 5, § 1, the famous Riot Act passed
by Parliament to deal with the riots accompanying George's ascension to the throne. In
the statute of 7 & 8 GEo. IV, c. 31 (1827) provision was made that the execution was
not to be levied on any particular inhabitant. The present English statute is found in 49
& 50 Vicr. (1886) c. 38.
16. See Borchard, supra note 3; see United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 206 (1882)
wherein Judge Miller says: ". . . it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests."
17. Note 11, supra.
18. Ibid.
19. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285 (1883).
20. Pennsylvania Co. v. City of Chicago, 81 Fed. 317 (1897); Pittsburg, C. C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Chicago, 242 Ill. 78, 89 N. E. 1022. (1909); Darlington v. City of New York, 31
N. Y. 163 (1865); Champaign County v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50 (1900).
21. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313 (1911). In Williams v. New Orleans, 23
La. Ann. 507 (1871) it was said, "The law on which this action is based is not made de-
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the individual members of the community. By levying a tax upon the entire
community, the municipality spreads the burden among its residents who
It is thought such statutes stimulate
thus ultimately pay for their protectioncitizens to prevent and suppress riots, making each a champion of peace and
good order.23 Perchance such legislation may compel the innocent to pay
for the acts of the guilty, but the courts have answered this by stating that
"this effect is not peculiar to the case, but necessarily results from the structure
of society and the nature of all institutions."2-1 The legislatures must have
realized that the injured plaintiff, in the absence of such statutes, would have
to face the difficulties of identifying the members of the mob, of prosecuting
a successful action, and of collecting a judgment against a defendant who
would generally be financially irresponsible.
ConstitutionalProblems
Immediately and inevitably the "mob violence" statutes were subjected to
constitutional attack. The wedge of attack was aimed at the taxes generally
levied by the city or county to raise the monies awarded the individual
sufferer under these statutes.2 3 Thus it was urged that such type of taxation
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by taking property without due process
pendent for its operation on the existence or non-existence of a police force."
It is interesting to note that in international law, responsibility of the states for mob
violence is predicated upon failure to exercise due diligence in preventing or suppressing
the riot. See BoRcHAp, Tn DpLomAc PRomoiIoN- or Crrzzsa;s ABro. (1915) 224.
22. Note 19, supra. See COOLLY, TA.rzoN (4th ed. 1924) 430.
23. Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N. Y. 164, 187 (1865). In Ratcliffe v. Eden,
2 Cowp. 489, 48S, 98 Eng. Reprints 1200, 1202 (K. B. 1776) Lord Mansfield said that the
principle is that the inhabitants shall be in the nature of sureties for one another, mutual

pledges for each others' good behavior. In Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397, 413
(1879) it was said that the effect of such legislation was to make each citizen a detective,
on the alert to detect as well as to prevent and punish crime.
24. In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pa. 204, 209 (1847). This situation in taxation is not
unusual. For example school taxes are levied without regard to whether the taxpayers
have school children. In view of the fact that in the United States lynching and riots
are recurrent to a degree exceptional among civilized states, it seems only fitting that at
least that much protection is bestowed. See E.tGLEON, TE Rrwsrousmxrr" or Sr,%TmS n;
INTEENATIO.NAL

LlW (1928) 131.

25. EAorzsou, supra note 24, at 130, explains the difficulties of conviction thus: "Mob
action reflects a strongly excited public opinion, which has a deterrent effect upon witnesses, juries, and even judges and other officials of the states.'
26. Statutes making specific provision for a tax levy are: CAr. Por.. Conz (Deering,
1931) § 4455; NEB. CoNTx. Srr. (1929) § 26-606; Oino CODn Aza. (Page, 1931) § 6285;
PA. STAr. A-nr. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 18, § 339; W. VA. OrInICIL Coo (1931) 61-6-12. The
New York and Illinois statutes have been held not to impose a tax or create a debt.
In Darlington v.
Chicago v. Manhattan Cement Co., 178 Ill. 372, 58 N. E. 63 (1899).
City of New York, 31 N. Y. 164, 186 (1865) it was said: "The act of 1855 does not impose
a tax of any kind, either state or municipal. Its provisions may and doubtless will lead
to the necessity of local taxation.... The act does not create a debt or claim. If no person should suffer damage by riot or mob, no money would be required and no debt or
charge would ever be created... 2'
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of law.2 7 But the aura of antiquity surrounding this kind of legislation, which
first appeared before the Magna Charta,28 provided a strong argument in its
support.29 The ultimate basis, however, on which the courts unanimously
sustained its constitutionality was the police power. 30 Starting with the concept
that the preservation of peace and social order is a basic function of government
placed by the state in the hands of the municipality, it was convincingly concluded that the state might make such corporate entities responsible for lapses
in the public peace caused by riots and mobs.31 The fundamental justification
for the exercise of police power is that the welfare of the community at large
is paramount to that of the individual, and that in a clash between these
interests the former must prevail. 32 An unusual feature of mob violence
statutes, as an exercise of the police power, is that such legislation is directed
towards the alleviation of individual losses, for which the community through
tax levies indirectly pays.
What Is a Mob?
To obtain the benefits of such statutes, it is necessary to show that the
damage resulted from the acts of a mob or riot.3 3 Thus an ever recurring
problem before the courts is the composition of a mob or riotous assemblage.
Seven of the statutes define a mob, 34 but, with the exception that a minimum
numerical constituency is required in five such acts 3 r their phraseology is so
indefinite as to require interpretation by the courts.30 Where a statute is
27. Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N. Y. 164 (1865) The contention was here
unsuccessfully raised that the statute not only deprived taxpayers of their property but also
the municipal corporations of their privately owned property.
28. 1 RaavEs, HISTORY OF ENGLiSH LAW (2d ed. 1787) 17.
29. Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N. Y. 164 (1865).
30. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285 (1883); Palmer v. City of Concord, 48
N. H. 211 (1868); Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N. Y. 164 (1865).
The fact that such statutes impose absolute liability upon city or county has been held
not to affect their constitutionality. Iola v. Birnbaum, 71 Kan. 600, 81 Pac. 198 (1905);
Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313 (1911).
31. See Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397, 419 (1879) wherein it was said:
"There is an implied contract between the state and every municipality upon which It
bestowes a portion of its sovereignty, that such municipality shall preserve the public peace
The privileges conferred must be taken with
and maintain good order within its borders ....
"
such burdens as the law making power chooses to annex thereto.
32. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
33. Fauvia v. New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 410 (1868); Yalenezian v. City of Boston,
238 Mass. 538, 131 N. E. 220 (1921). What constitutes a mob or riot under the English
statute has been settled: Field v. Receiver, L. R. (19071 2 K. B. 853.
In the United States the term mob has been held to be practically synonymous
with rioters: Koska v. Kansas City, 123 Kan. 362, 255 Pac. 57 (1927); Adamson v. City
of New York, 188 N. Y. 255, 80 N. E. 937 (1905).
34. See the statutes of Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, and West Virginia, supra note 11.
35. Illinois requires 5 or more; Massachusetts 12 or more; New Jersey 5 or more;
Rhode Island 6 or more; West Virginia 5 or more.,
36. For instance the Ohio statute, supra note 11, reads: "A collection of people assembled
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enacted subsequent to a penal statute making riot a crime, the latter is often
consulted; 37 in the absence of such pre-existent penal statute, the courts look
to the well established common law definition of riot 38 Certain dearly defined principles may be gathered only by breaking down the term into its
essential components. It is generally held that the size and strength of the
gathering are immaterial, 39 although a civil revolution has been excluded from
the operation of a mob violence statute.40 Another commonly followed concept is that it is not necessary that the original assembly be for an unlawful
purpose if thereafter concerted action of an unlawful nature exists. 4 ' Although
concerted purpose is a usual requisite, 4- that the assemblage does not in fact
intend harm is immaterial 43 if actual harm results. Those jurisdictions, 'which
follow the common law definition, require that the members of the mob should
for an unlawful' purpose and intending to do damage or injury to anyone, or pretending to
exercise correctional power over other persons by violence and without authority of la%,
shall be deemed a 'mob' for the purpose of this chapter' (italics inserted)." The courts
have interpreted the "or" in the statute to mean "and" and have held that there Imust be
an exercise of correctional power for a mob to exist. Lexa, v. Zmunt, 123 Ohio 510, 176
N. E. 82 (1931).
37. City of' Cherryvale v. Hawman, 80 Kan. 170, 101 Pac. 994 (1909).
38. Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 238 Mlass. 538, 131 N. E. 220 (1921); Adamson v.
City of New York, 188 N. Y. 255, 80 N. E. 937 (1905). But cf. Feinstein v. City of New
York, 283 N. Y. Supp. 335 (Mun. CL 1935) (a recent case growing out of the
Harlem riots wherein it was held proper to charge the criminal definition in the statute
as well as the common law definition).
The common law definition of riot as given in HAwxs, PLrs or = Cnorrz, c. 65,
§ 1 is: "A tumultous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons assembling together of their own authority, with an intent mutually to assist one another against any
one who shall oppose them."
39. City of Chicago v. Penn. Co., 119 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902); Allegheny County
v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397 (1879).
However, it seems that there must be at least'three persons to constitute a mob. Aron
v. City of Wausau, 98 Wis. 592, 74 N. W. 354 (1898); 2 W R Tozz, Cn. rA, MAw (12th
ed. 1932) § 1858. In Duryea v. City of New York, 10 Daly 300 (N. Y. C. P. 1882) it
was said that the legislature did not intend to impose liability for acts of malicious mischief done to gratify individual propensity and that the legislature could not have intended
to impose liability in such cases, thus making the city an insurer of perfect quiet.
40. Street v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 577 (18S0).
41. Blakeman v. City of Wichita, 93 Kan. 444, 144 Pac. 816 (1914); Solomon
v. City of Kingston, "24 Hun 562 (N. Y., 1881) (original assemblage was for the purpose
of watching a fire on plaintiff's property). Champaign County v. Church, 62 Ohio 318,
57 N. E. 50 (1900).
42. Kretchmar v. City of Atchison, 133 Kan. 198, 299 Pac. 621 (1931); Aron v. City
of Wausau, 98 Wis. 592, 74 N. W. 354 (1898) (plaintiff was injured by a firecracker
thrown by a member of a crowd celebrating July 4th, held, that each person was the sole
manipulator of his own firecracker and that there was no concerted intent or purpose
to injure plaintiff). Cf. City of Cherryvale v. Hawman, 80 Kan. 170, 101 Pac. 994 (1909);
City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S. W. 269 (1902).
43. City of Cherryvale v. Hawman, 80 Kan. 170, 101 Pac. 994 (1909) (charivari party
celebrating a marriage); Hendren v. Arkansas City, 122 Kan. 361, 252 Pac. 218 (1927).
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intend to mutually aid and assist one another, 44 and that the acts done be to
the terror of the people. 45 Applications by the courts of these rules to specific
situations illustrate the difficulties of exact definition. 40 Thus the damage
to an employer's property by his striking employees, 47 and the harm done
to a woman by a band of merrymakers on Christmas eve,4 8 have been held
to be the result of mob action. On the other hand, a plaintiff who was injured by participants in a Communistic uprising, who were guilty of a breach
of the peace, 49 and a plaintiff whose dilapidated building was pulled down by
a group of men and boys to furnish fuel for an election eve bonfireu0 were
held not to have suffered damages at the hands of a mob. The courts have
wisely recognized the danger of bringing non-riotous criminal acts within the
purview of such statutes. 51 Accordingly it has been held that a waiter assaulted
by eight men who refused to pay a bill was not injured by a mob.0 2
It is perhaps best that the legislatures, when dealing with such an unpredictable and fluctuating type of action as mob violence, have provided either
no definition of a mob or else so vague a formula that it may be readily adapted
to fit the instant situation. No rule of thumb can categorize such a display
of human emotion. The courts by a process of judicial legislation have erected
a precinct within the confines of which the average mob will fall. Thus, the
size of the assembly, its lawful origin, and its intention to do no harm are
immaterial, but concerted action, the ultimate illegality of the assemblage, and
actual harm are essential.
Situs of Mob as Affecting Liability
Even when the existence of a mob has been proved, the problem may arise
of establishing liability where the mob originates in a county or city other
than the one wherein the injury is inflicted.58 The majority view holds that
The statutes of Nebraska and Ohio, supra note 11, provide that a person suffering death

from a mob attempting to lynch another person is within the protection of the statute.
44. Adamson v. City of New York, 188 N. Y. 255, 80 N. E. 937 (1905); Field v.
Receiver (1907) 2 K. B. 853. Contra: Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 238 Mass. 538,
131 N. E. 220 (1921).
45. Duryea v. City of New York, 10 Daly 300 (N. Y. C. P. 1882). Contra: Commonwealth v. Runnels, 10 Mass. 522 (1813).
46. It is questionable whether one whose person or property was injured when officers

attempted to quell a mob would be held to have suffered injuries at the hands of a mob,
See Chicago League Club v. City of Chicago, 77 Ill. App. 124 (1897), aft'd, 196 Ill. 154,

63 N. E. 695 (1897); Hammet v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N. E. 36 (1932).
47.

Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City of Spring Valley, 65 Ill. App. 571 (1895).

48.

City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S. W. 269 (1902).

49. Hammett v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N. E. 36 (1932).
50. Duryea v. City of New York, 10 Daly 300 (N. Y. C. P. 1882).

51. Koska v. Kansas City, 123 Kan. 362, 255 Pac. 57 (1927).
52. Lexa v. Zmunt, 123 Ohio 510, 176 N. E. 82 (1931).
53. In Sturges v. City of Chicago, 237111. 46, 86 N. E. 683 (1908) defendant contended
that it made the location of the injured property and not the place the mob assembled
or the riot occurred the criterion of liability. To emphasize this position it was urged that
a mob may assemble in one city or county and by the use of dynamite or cannon destroy
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the liability is to be controlled by the situs of the injury.5 4 It would seem
unjust in such a case that a county or city should bear the burden of the
adjoining county or city's negligence in failing to quell the mob at its inception.m Some of the statutes providing a cause of action for lynchingm
attempt to solve this problem. Thus the statutes of two statesP7 provide that
the county wherein the lynching is committed, although liable to deceased's
representatives, may recover from the county whence the mob came. The
statute of one state5 s stipulates that where the victim was transported through
a number of counties prior to the lynching, each of such counties shall be
jointly and separately liable in an action brought by the state for the benefit of
the victim's family; 59 on the other hand another statute has declared that such
counties are not liable unless their citizens or officers participate thereinScO
Oddly enough, only one legislature had the foresight to attempt to apportion
the damages among the counties upon whom liability would be imposed. 1
Who May Bring the Action?

The statutes allowing recovery for property damages do not precisely
specify the parties entitled to bring such action. Liberality of interpretation3
is evident in the decisions of the courts.(' It has thus been held that bailees,0
or injure property in another city or county. The court held the statute constitutional and
refused to decide the question since that sort of case was not before it.
54. See the California, Illinois, Kentucky, Blaine, Maryland, lassachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and South Carolina statutes, supra note 11. In Lanbani
v. City of Buckhannon, 97 W. Va. 339, 125 S.E. 157 (1924) the statute of West Virginia,
though seemingly otherwise, was so interpreted.
55. An unusual situation occurred in Easter v. City of El Dorado, 104 Kan. 57, 177
Pac. 538 (1919) wherein plaintiff's home was located just outside the city limits; a mob
within the city limits threw stones and shot at the house causing considerable damage,
held, the plaintiff could recover from the city.
56. See personal injuries statutes, supra note 11.
57. See the Nebraska and Ohio statutes in note 11, supra.
58. See the Pennsylvania statute in note 11, supra
59. This statute provides that if the deceased leaves no dependent family, then the
sum shall be forfeited to the commonwealth.
60. See the West Virginia statute in note 11, supra.

61. See the Connecticut statute in note 11 supra, which provides that the tax commissioner, the Attorney-General and the comptroller shall act as a board of assesors.
62. A corporation has been held to be a proper party plaintiff. Spring Valley Coal Co.
v. Spring Valley, 65 Ill.
App. 571 (1895); Butte Miners' Union v. City of Butte, 58 Mont.
391, 194 Pac. 149 (1920) (labor union held proper party plaintiff). A municipal corporation has been allowed to sue a county. Kensington v. County of Philadelphia, 13 Pa. 76
(1850). It is settled that plaintiff need not be a citizen or resident. WElliams v. Nev
Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 507 (1871).
178, 89 N. E. 1022 (1909).
63. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill.
The liability of the bailee is that of an insurer in such case, as mob violence is not an act
of the public enemy. (4 ELuorr, RA. oADs § 1458). Since many of the statutes do not
provide for full indemnity, the owner will elect to pursue his remedy against the balee,
who should therefore be allowed to sue the city or county.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

life-tenants, 64 tenants-in-common,65 trustees,6 6 and mortgagees 7 may bring
such an action. In actions for personal injuries where death results, the statutes generally specify as a proper party plaintiff the deceased's personal representatives. 68 The statutes of several states would seem to imply that the
injured party's right of action against the county does not exclude an alternative action against the rioters.6 9 Only one case has been found definitely
holding that judgment might be recovered both from those responsible for
the riot and the municipality. 70 The general trend is to subrogate the city or
county, which has paid the stipulated statutory damages, to the individual's
71
cause of action against the rioters.
Defenses
Although the statutes impose absolute liability upon the defendant city or
county precluding the corporate body from setting up the defense of due
diligence 72 most statutes allow the defendant to assert the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a bar to the action. 73 The statutes vary in their terminology in defining contributory negligence, 74 but no court would dispute
64. Greer v. City of New York, 3 Rob. 406 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1865).
65. Loomis v. Oneida County, 6 Lans. 269 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
66. Onslow v. Smith, 3 Doug. 348 (K. B. 1774).
67. Levy v. City of New York, 3 Rob. 194 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1865) (mortgagee entitled
to recover only when he could establish injury to the security for his debt; recovery was
denied, such evidence being lacking).
68. The Pennsylvania statute, supra note 11, provides, however, that the attorney
general shall bring the action and turn over the proceeds to the deceased's dependent family, or if no family, it shall be forfeited to the Commonwealth.
69. See Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina statutes in
note 11, supra.
70. Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, 98 Ohio 73, 120 N. E. 207 (1918).
71. See the Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina statutes, supra note 11.
72. See note 23, supra. The Maryland statute, supra note 11, alone provides that the
city or county is not absolutely liable.
73. See California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Wisconsin statutes in note 11,

supra.
74. The New York statute, note 11, supra (which has quite a following) states
that recovery may be had "if the consent or negligence of such person did not contribute
to the destruction or injury, and such person shall have used all reasonable diligence to prevent such damage." Under the New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina statutes,
supra note 11, the plaintiff is barred by his illegal or improper conduct, See Underhill
v. Manchester, 45 N. H. 214 (1864); Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 211 (1868) (printing
libelous articles tending to incite a breach of the peace constitutes illegal and improper
conduct).
Where a statute, such as the Montana act, supra note 11, fals to specify that contributory negligence is a defense, it has been held ". . . it is one of the legal maxims of the
jurisprudence of this state that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. In the
present case, however, nothing short of the commission of an overt act by some agency
authorized or abetted by the plaintiff itself to which the damage can be clearly attrlb-
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that where plaintiff instigates or participates in the mob or riot, it constitutes
a complete defense. 75 That the destroyed property had been used as a nuisance
does not bar plaintiff's action 70 nor mitigate defendant's liability for damages; 77
thus, it has been held no defense that the destruction or injury was to a house
of ill fame,7s or to a porgy oil factory emitting such stench as to render the
surrounding community unhealthful. 7 It has wisely been determined that a
plaintiff is not negligent in failing or wilfully refusing to take human life
in protection of his property.8 0 Some of the statutes specify that the plaintiff
must exert all efforts to procure the conviction of the offenders, 8' but it would
seem that relief should not be denied an otherwise diligent plaintiff for failure
to observe this requirement which tends to impose upon him the duties of
a sheriff and district attorney.
Many of the statutes provide that the plaintiff should prove as part of
his case the notification to the authorities of the impending riot.82 If this
requirement were strictly construed, 3 it would in effect make the plaintiff's
recovery dependent upon the lack of secrecy or celerity on the part of the
rioters.8 4 The courts, however, have interpreted the statutes reasonably and
uted would relieve the city of responsibility under the statute." Butte Miners' Union v.
City of Butte, 58 Mont. 391, 401, 194 Pac. 149, 151 (1920).
75. Paladino v. Westchester County, 47 Hun 337 (N. Y. 1888); Wing Chung v. City
of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 531 (1874). The Kentucky statute, supra note 11, bars recovery
where the plaintiff unlawfully contributes by word or deed towards inciting or inflaming
such tumult or riot.
76. As the court says in Blodgett v. City of Syracuse, 36 Barb. 526, 532 (N. Y. 1362),
"It is always unsafe to let loose a multitude without legal restraint, and better to Eustain some inconveniences and even endure some wrongs until they can be redressed in the
regular and due administration of justice, than to live under the jurisdiction of Judge
Lynch, however valuable in their resulL% his services have sometimes been." Similarly It
has been held no defense that the property destroyed was used by the plaintiff corporation
in carrying on an ultra vires business. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City of Spring Valley,
65 Ill. App. 571 (1395).
77. Brightman v. Bristol, 65 ,fe. 426 (1875). Contra: Stevens v. City of Anthony,
82 Kan. 179, 107 Pac. 557 (1910).
78. Ely v. Supervisors of Niagara County, 36 N. Y. 297 (1867). Under the Vscondin
statute, supra note 11, it is provided that property owners who have notice that the
property is used as a house of ill fame may not recover.
The Missouri statute, -upra note 11, says that the city or county is not liable for the
destruction of any property used in a manner prohibited by state or United States laws
or city ordinances.
79. Brightman v. Bristol, 65 Mlaine 426 (1875).
80. Spring Valley Coal Co. v City of Spring Valley, 65 Ill.
App. 571 (1895).
81. See the Mlaine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island statutes in note 11, supra.
82. See the Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina
statutes in note 11, supra.
83. In an early case, Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of Philadelphia, Brightly
116 (Pa. Nisi Prius 1847) writlen notice was required, but fortunately no other case stems
in accord.
84. Moody v. Supervisors of Niagara County, 46 Barb. 659 (N. Y. 1866).
It has been held that notice given by an employer does not inure to the benefit of an
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have held that there must be time and opportunity to give notice. 85 It has
recently been decided that the city has constructive notice where it knows that
riots were prevalent in the plaintiff's vicinity. before the particular injury occurred.86 Since the object of the required notice is protection of the plaintiff
or his property, the courts have decided that such notice need not have been
given if useless to prevent the damage.8 7
Damages
Many of the statutes place arbitrary limitations upon the amount of damages
recoverable. 88 There is a prevalent reluctance to give complete indemnity and
thus the wronged plaintiff in some states may recover only three-quarters
of his damage, 9 while in others his damages may not exceed a stipulated sum. 0
The statutes allowing damages for personal injuries have suffered a more
strict construction by our courts than those providing for property damage.0'
It is odd that the courts should be more zealous to protect property rights
than personal rights. Thus, one case, in construing a statute which affords
damages to anyone who "shall be injured in his person" has held that the
injuries must result in death to give rise to the action.02 It would seem that
where a person is subject to mob violence mental pain and suffering would
form a considerable portion of his injury. While it has been decided that
such damages might be allowed where accompanied by physical injury, 0 no
employee: Long v. Neenah, 128 Wis. 40, 107 N. W. 10 (1906). Likewise it has been held
that notice of threats of mob violence conveyed to an employee does not constitute notice
to the employer and therefore his failure to give notice does not bar his action. Portage
Co-op Creamery Ass'n. v. Sauk County, 216 Wis. 501, 257 N. W. 614 (1934).
85. Feinstein v. City of New York, 157 Misc. 157, 283 N. Y. Supp. 335 (N. Y. Mun.
Ct. 1935); the court said in Solomon v. City of Kingston, 24 Hun 562, 565 (1881) aff'd,
96 N. Y. 651 (1884): "When the crowd became a riot, there was no time to give notice."
86. Feinstein v. City of New York, 157 Misc. 157, 283 N. Y. Supp. 335 (N. Y. Mun.
Ct. 1935); Newberry v. City of New York, 1 Sweeney 369 (N. Y. 1869).
87. Schiellein v. Supervisors of Kings County, 43 Barb. 490 (N. Y. 1865). Under the
modes of conveyance at that time, it would have taken the officers so long to reach the
scene of the riot that the harm would have been done before their arrival. In these
days of radio equipped police cars, it would seem that even a short notice would secure
protection.
88. See the Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island statutes in note 11, supra.
89. See the Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes in note 11, supra.
90. See the Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, and West Virginia statutes in note 11, supra.
91. Lexa v. Zmunt, 123 Ohio 510, 176 N. E. 82 (1931); Brazzill v. Lancaster, 132
S. C. 347, 128 S. E. 728 (1925); Lanham v. City of Buckhannon, 97 V. Va. 339, 125
S. E. 157 (1924) (the statutes being in derogation of' common law must be strictly construed). The Kansas statute, supra note 11, provides that the character of the person
injured may be shown in mitigation of damages. Adams v. Salina, 58 Kan. 246, 48 Pac.
-918 (1897).
92. Italics supplied. Brown v. Orangeburg County, 55 S. C. 45, 32 S. E. 764 (1899)
(this case so holds although the statute does not so provide). The Minnesota, Nebraska and
Pennsylvania statutes, supra note 11, expressly so provide. The North Carolina statute
-would seem to limit recovery to victims, who were prisoners.
93. Hendren v. Arkansas City, 122 Kan. 361, 252 Pac. 218 (1927).
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case has been found allowing compensation where unaccompanied by physical
harm. Exemplary damages have been rightly denied, since the purpose of
the statutes is remedial and not penal. 4
A determination of the damages recoverable under statutes affording relief
for injuries to property is intimately connected with the courts' construction
of the term, property. The courts have generally construed the statutes
liberally. 5 It has wisely been determined that property stolen by a rioter is
property destroyed or injured within the phraseology of the statute 5 since
common-sense reasoning discloses that it is of little import to the property owner

whether his property is destroyed by ruinous violence or taken by theft. Then
too there is the problem of whether an injury to intangible property rights,
which may often overshadow tangible property injury, is compensable. The
paucity of cases on this question is unexpected.

Where the claimant is en-

gaged in commercial enterprise, injuries to such intangibles, 7 as good Will,
might also be connected with the physical injury to his property. Though
recovery for both items seems justifiable in such case, according to the most
recent holding such damages are refused. 9s

94. Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of Philadelphia, Brightly 116 (Pa. NLi Prius
1847) (though exemplary damages were not recoverable against the city or county, exemplary
damages might be recovered in a suit against the rioters). But see Adams v. City of
Salina, 58 Kan. 246, 48 Pac. 918 (1897) (exemplary damages might be given where accompanied by actual damage).
95. City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S. W. 269 (1902); Yalenezian v.
City of Boston, 238 lass. 538, 131 N. E. 220 (1921); Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City of
Spring Valley, 65 Ill.
App. 571 (1895). Contra: Wells Fargo & Co. v. Mayor of Jersey
City, 219 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 3d, 1915) Warr v. Darlington County, 186 S. E. 920 (S. C.
1936). The South Carolina statute which seemingly authorized a recovery from the
county for injury to property as a result of mob violence has been narrowly construed
to limit recovery to cases where the damage was caused incidentally to an infringement
of the political rights and liberties of the citizen.
It has been held that human life is not property within the meaning of a statute affording damages for property injuries. Gianfortone v. New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64 (E. D.
La. 1894).
96. Sarles v. City of New York, 47 Barb. 447 (N. Y. 1866); Solomon v. City of King,ton, 24 Hun 562, 565 (N. Y. 1381), aff'd, 96 N. Y. 651 (1884); Spring Valley Coal Co. v.
City of Spring Valley, 65 flL App. 571 (1895). .Contra: Yalenezian v. City of Boston
238 Mass. 538, 544, 131 N. E. 220, 222 (1921): "A theft of property does not signify that
the thing stolen has been destroyed or injured; it imports only an injury to the possessory
right of the general or special owner to use and enjoy the thing which is capable of being
stolen."
97. Of recent years industrial strikes have accounted for much mob violence; in such
cases it would seem that the injury to the good will of the business and the loss of business arising from the metheds used by the strikers would be more serious than the acts
of physical violence.
98. In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Mayor of Jersey City, 219 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 3d, 1915),
the court refused plaintiff recovery for damages for its intangible property which damages
greatly outweighed those to tangible property; the court based its decision on a rather strict
construction of the New Jersey statute. Since the purpose of such statutes is indemnity,
there does not appear to be much rdason for limiting recovery for damage to tangible
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Although many of the statutes provide that the city or county may recover
0
the amount of the judgment and costs from any member of the mob, such
°
procedure does not seem to be followed;10 the reason has been suggested that
"the extraordinary waves of popular passion which produce the result are apt
to infect the authorities as well, to the extent of idle observation, if not of
actual participation." 1 1 Probably, however, the failure to prosecute such
actions is attributable to the difficulties of identification, conviction, and satisfaction of judgment, which may be caused by lack of legal evidence, jury
apathy, 02 or financial irresponsibility. 0 3

Conclusion
That mob violence statutes are sociologically desirable can hardly be denied.
Although the so-called deterrent value of such laws may be dubious, 10 4 it is
clear that they help make more real the protection of life and property which

is theoretically enjoyed by the members of a community. It should be noted,
however, that there is need for great improvement in this field of legislation;
inconsistencies, inadequate treatment of important problems, and even a com-

plete disregard of the necessity for any such relief appear upon a survey of
the treatment accorded by the various state legislatures.

For example, in the

South where undeniably the lynching evil is more prevalent, only three states
afford protection for personal injuries. 105

Other jurisdictions allowing relief

for personal injuries require in effect that death be a condition precedent to
property. A possible justification for this stand is that fraudulent claimants might be
tempted to exaggerate their intangible property damage proof of which is sometimes less susceptible of refutation by the defendant than tangible damage.
99. See the Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and West Virginia statutes in note 11 slupra.
100. The currently prevalent "sit-down" strikes, accompanied by much mob violence,
may culminate in actions under the mob violence statutes. Because of the advent of organized union activity by financially responsible units, the city or county may choose to
sue such organization by proving the latter's responsibility for the strike.
101. EAGLETON, TnE RESPONSIBIITY OF STATES ix INxTRNATIONAL LAW (1928) 137.
102. A realization of such "jury apathy" is found in the West Virginia statute, supra
note 11, which provides "In any prosecrtion for any of the offenses defined herein or any
forfeiture action everyone who has participated therein or who entertains or has expressed
any opinion in favor of lynching or in the justification or excusd thereof or whose character, conduct, or opinions are such as in the court's judgment may tend to disqualify
him for an impartial or unprejudiced trial shall be disqualified to act as a juror."
103. It is submitted that a substantial judgment against the participants in the mob
would be no more collectible than the $10,000,000 fine levied against the strikers in the
recent General Motors Strike.
104. See Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397 (1879) wherein the court said that
the application of the act to the Philadelphia riots of 1844 inculcated a lesson of inestimable
value to the municipal authorities and taxpayers of that city, the results of which are seen
in a well trained police force, and a freedom from mob violence that was exceptional.
However, despite this optimistic view, it would seem that such legislation has not influenced
the violence accompanying the most prevalent form of modern riots, strikes.
105. See the North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia statutes supra note 11.
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recovery.' 016 Incompleteness of treatment is evidenced by the reluctance on
the part of many states to give protection for both personal and property darnages.'0 7 Thus while it is true that seven states'08 do give relief for both types,
eleven states'0 9 have considered property rights paramount to personal rights
and have denied recovery for the latter. There are five states n O whose statutes furnish relief for personal injuries, but conversely they do not deem property rights as worthy of recognition. Twenty-six states have completely ignored
the necessity for such legislation.
It is to be hoped that the various state legislatures in the near future will
take cognizance of the need for adequate mob-violence statutes, and either
strengthen existing legislation, or pass initial laws upon this subject. The
current wave of "sit-down" strikes, which are generally accompanied by riotous
action, may direct public opinion towards the enactment of such protective
statutes. Such legislation is and will be in accord with the growing trend
(evidenced by social security, and bank deposit insurance legislation) towards
the transfer of the risk of loss, for ills produced by the very nature of society,
from the impecunious individual to the community as a whole.

NEw Yolu-Irs PAST, PRESENT
FurulE.-It is a familiar fact that some stubborn bits of archaic form
often persist after they have outlived their usefulness.' Respect for the doctrine
of stare decisis frequently so retards judicial change that legislative action is
imperative to remove rigid outdated formalism.2 The history of the garnishment of intangible debts in New York furnishes an apt illustration of a deeply
rooted anachronism which has long resisted persistent demands for revision
with resultant interruption of remedial expedients. Opposing repeated arguGARNIS5HnENT OF INTANGIBLE DEBTS IN

AN

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See the Minnesota, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania statutes supra note 11.
See supra, note 11.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid.

1. A classic example of the existence of such an ancient rule enduring long after the
reasons for its continuance have passed away, is found in the modern application of the
Rule in Shelley's Case. See Doyle v. Andis, 127 Iowa 36, 37, 102 N. W. 177, 177 (1905);
Yates v. Yates, 104 Neb. 678, 680, 178 N. W. 262, 263 (1920); Legis. (1935) 4 FoNAMI
L. RE-v. 316, 316-327. Another characteristic illustration of such a situation is to be found
in the rule of the New York courts which have reiterated the common law doctrine
with reference to the limited contractual liability of infants. See Sternlieb v. Normandie
Nat. Sec. Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 247-251, 188 N. E. 726, 726-728 (1934); Obiter Dictum
(1936) 5 FoiRona= L. Rxv. 379, 379-380.
2. Many examples of legislative action removing such anachronisms are included among
the laws sponsored by the New York judicial Council in the course of the past two years.
See Saxe, Review of Laws Sponsored by the Judicial Counci7 for 1935, N. Y. B. A. Bu..
(June 1935) 136; Saxe, Review of Laws Sponsored by the Judicial Councd for 1936, N. Y.
B. A. BULL. (Sept. 1936) 193.
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ments3 which disclosed the inconsistencies and shortcomings of the local law,
the New York courts have steadily defied a mounting weight of authority

antagonistic to their position. It was only after the New York Judicial Council
penned a memorandum 4 vigorously advocating a statutory change that the
legislature acted and amended the existing statute. By the enactment it is
believed that the value of garnishment has been appreciably enhanced, and

an effective weapon has been added to the arsenal of creditors seeking relief
against delinquent non-resident debtors.

To weigh and evaluate the effect of the penetrating amendment in New
York procedure, this comment will be divided into the following topics: I. The
Historical Background and Nature of Garnishment; II. The Garnishment of
Intangible Debts in New York-A Deeply Rooted Anachronism; III. The New
Legislation and Its Corrective Consequences.
I.

THE HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF GARNISHMENT

Garnishment proceedings in America c stem from the so-called Custom of
Foreign Attachment of London. 7 This ancient remedy was intended to secure
a defendant's appearance in an action by the plaintiff when the defendant was
outside of the forum. Thus a person holding property of the defendant within
the city could be brought into the proceeding by a warning order which would
require him to retain the property for the plaintiff's benefit in the event that
3. See p. 291, infra.
4. See note 62, infra.
5. As amended by New York Laws, 1936, c. 818, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 916 provdes,
as far as relevant: "LEvY uPoN CAUSE OF ACTION, EVIDENCE OF DEBT OR CEAM TO ESTATE.
The attachment may also be levied upon a cause of action arising upon contract; Including a bond, promissory note, or other instrument for the payment of money only, negotiable or otherwise, whether past due or yet to become due, executed by a foreign or
domestic government, state, county, public officer, association, municipal or other corporation, or by a private person either within or without the state; which belongs to the
defendant and is found within the county. Within the meaning of this section there
shall be included any indebtedness due or to become due from a non-resident or a foreign
corporation, upon whom or which: service of process may be made within this sqate, to
any person whether a non-resident or foreign corporation. The levy of the attachment
thereupon is deemed a levy upon, and a seizure and attachment of the debt represented
thereby .... ." (Italics supplied).
6. Garnishment has received a varied nomenclature among American jurisdictions;
thus it is referred to in some states a foreign attachment: CoNx. GEN. STAT. (1930)
§ 5763; KAN. REv. STAT. (1923) § 60-940. In others it has been referred to as trustee
process: MAss. LAvs ANN. (Lawyer's Co-op. 1933) c. 246, § 1; N. H. Pun. LAws (1926)
c. 356, whereas in the majority of states it is simply called garnishment: FLA. Co=n'. GEN.
LAws AxNs. (1927) § 5284; Mo. RFV. STAT. (1929) § 1396. In New York, the garnishment remedy forms a part of the attachment law: see N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACr (1920) § 902
et seq. However, for the separable, though related, remedy of garnishee-execution, see
p. 293, infra.
7. See DRAxE, LAW or SurTs BY ATTAcHMMEqT nr T= UumTE STATES (6th ed. 1886)
§ 450; ROOD, LAW OF GARNISHMIENT (1896) § 5; but see, Locx., FoRmaxo ATrACSENW T,
194 quoting from Wilson's Roman Antiquities, which suggested that the garnishment proceeding originated in the Roman law.
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the defendant made no appearance and that the plaintiff procured a judgment
in the main action. 8 The basic idea of the Custom of Foreign Attachment of
London was incorporated into the statutory law of many American jurisdictions.0
However, the old objective of thereby inducing the defendant to make an
appearance in the action was partially abandoned. In its present form, the
garnishment proceeding is a form of attachment, whereby a defendant's property is reached in the hands of a third person who is warned to retain it
subject to the court's order;' 0 in the first or so-called main action, the plaintiff
8. Asmxr,

ATTAcHENT, 11;

3 BL. CO'M.

*280; RoLL,

Amnm. Cuso0m or Lo:-

Doxr, k. 13.

9. ALA. CODE A. w. (IMichie, 1928) §§ 8051-S093; Anz. REv. CODE Ai.N. (Struckmeyer,
1928) §§ 4258-4277; Ann. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 4905-4918; CAr. CoDz
Civ. Psoc. (Deering, 1931) §§ 542, 543-545; Co.".. GEN€. STAT. REv. (1930) §§ 5763-5780;
FLA. Coars. GEN. LAws ANx. (1927) §§ 5284, 5299-5308; GA. CODE (Harrison, 1933)
§§ 8-501 to 8-508; IDAho CODE AxN.

(1932)

§§ 6-507 to 6-523; ILL. REv. STAT. Am2.

(Smith-Hurd, 1935) § 21; ID. STAT. ANx. (Burns, 1933) §§ 3-501 to 3-548; IOwA CODE
(1935) §§ 12157-12176; KAv. REv. STAT. AmT.(1923) §§ 60-940 to 60-963;
s. RmV. STar.
(1930) c. 100; AID. ANn. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 9; ALMss. An. LAyWs (Lawyer's Co-op,
1933) c.246; Mcn. Comp.LAws (1929) cc. XXVIII,LXXVI; Mini. STAT. (Mason, 1927)

§§ 9356-9384; Miss. CODE Aim. (1930) §§ 1839-1962; Mo. Rrv. STAT. (1929) §§ 13961425; M NoT. REv. ANx. (Choate, 1921) §§ 9267-9300; NED. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§ 20-1001
to 20-1055; N. H. PuB.LAws (1926) c.356; N. M. STAT. Az.,;. (Courtvright, 1929) §§ 59101 to 59-134; N. Y. Civ. PRAc.AcT (1920) § 902 et seq.; N. C.CODE (1935) §§ 819-829;
N. D. Com. LAWS A-mn. (1913) §§ 7567-7587; Omo Grs. CODE Azzar. (Page, 1931)
§§ 10265-10289; ORE. CODE Aim. (1930) §§ 4-401 to 4-429; PA. STAT. Amz. (Purdon, 1936)
§§ 12-2861 to 12-3002; S.D. ComP. LAWS (1929) §§ 2453-2474b; TTnn. CODE (1933)
c.10, art. 1; Tmx STAT. REv. (Vernon, 1936) §§ 4076-4101; UTAH REv. STAT. A,:. (1933)
§§ 104-19-1 to 104-19-27; VI. Pus. LAws (1934) §§ 1746-1842; Wsir. Rv. StAr. Aznn.
(Remington, 1932) §§ 680-704; W. VA. CODE REv. (1931) c.38, art. 7,see particularly
c.38, art. 7-15; Wis. STAT. (1935) c.267. For an interesting disccuson of the use of
the process among the states, see 2 KErNT Com-. *403. Garnishment, ithas been hold,
being purely a statutory proceeding, ought to be strictly construed. United States v.Bailey,
52 F. (2d) 286 (D.C. Ga. 1931); Beasly v.Haney, 96 Ark. 568, 132 S. IV.646 (1910);
see Penoyar v.Kelsey, 150 N. Y. 77, 79, 44 N. E. 788, 789 (1896). But sce White v.
Simpson, 107 Ala. 386, 392, 18 So. 151, 152 (1895) suggesting that although garnishment
is a statutory injunction that "attachment law must be liberally construed to advance
the manifest intent of the law." This latter view, itis submitted, isthe better, in view
of the fact that garnishment is a procedural remedy and deserves a liberal construction. Cf.
Nevada Co. v. Farnsworth, 89 Fed. 164 (C. C. D. Utah 1898); Taylor v. Root, 43 N. Y.
335 (1868).
10. 1 BEuE, CoNmuTc OF LAWS (1935) § 107.5; see to same effect, Matthews v. Smith,
13 Neb. 178, 188, 12 N. W. 821, 825 (1882); Nat. Bank v. Furtick, 2 Marv. 35, 52, 42
Atl. 479, 481 (Del. 1897); Eagleson v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92, 100, 100 Pac. 765, 767 (1909).
But cf. Co~ler v. Sheffield Farms Co., Inc., 129 Misc. 600, 223 N. Y. Supp. 305 (City CL
1927). Garnishment is a distinctive form of attachment, in that property attached is not
directly seized and taken into sheriffs possession [Santa Fe Pac. R. R. v. Bossut, 10
N. M. 322, 335, 62 Pac. 977, 978 (1900)], but in a more practical sense [Roan, Gcm, mEN-T (1895) § 1] it is seized in the hands of a garnishee by notice to him [Beamer v.
Winter, 41 Kan. 596 (1889)], thereby creating an effectual lien upon the garnishment
property to satisfy whatever judgment the plaintiff may recover in the suit in which it
is issued [Marowitz v. Sun Ins. Office, 96 Wis. 175, 71 N. W. 109 (1397)].
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is presenting his claim against the defendant before the court; 1 and in the
second, or ancillary proceeding, pending the result of the main suit, a warrant
or writ is sought against the garnishee ordering him to retain the property
2
allegedly belonging to the defendant.'
Involved, therefore, in the typical garnishment are three parties: (1) a
plaintiff who seeks satisfaction of his claim due from the defendant out of the
latter's property; (2) a defendant against whom the plaintiff is bringing the
main action; and (3) the garnishee, who possesses the property which is sought
to be reached by the garnishment proceeding.' 3
In the garnishment proceeding, the determination of the court's jurisdiction
is frequently very important. Lacking in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, a plaintiff may still maintain an action against a delinquent non-resident
debtor through the exercise of control over the defendant's property within
the jurisdiction. 14 Nevertheless, since the kinds of property which may be
subjected to this proceeding are manifold, the courts have found the task of
ascertaining jurisdiction over the property of varying intricacy. Thus when
the property which is sought to be reached is of a tangible character, judges
have been faced with very little difficulty since such property is capable of
actual seizure by reason of its physical location within the state. 15 But when
the property which is sought to be reached is intangible, a much more vexatious
situation presents itself. 1 Unlike tangible property, choses in action, having
no actual situs and concrete existence, are mere relationships existing between
a creditor and a debtor whereby a right is present in the former and an obliga11. Cf. note 14, infra.
12. 1 BEAT, CoNrmrcT or LAWS (1935) § 107.5. However, the status of the third
party in these proceedings is solely that of a stakeholder. Nevian v. Poschinger, 23 Ind.
App. 695, 55 N. E. 1033 (1900) ; Biddle v. Girard National Bank, 109 Pa. 349 (1885).
13. GOODRICH, CoNpr-cr Or LAWS (1927) 127. The three terms, plaintiff, defendant,
and garnishee will be used in this cominent to denote the three parties, as indicated, who
are involved in the triangular process.
14. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); see Carpenter, Jurisdiction over Debts for
the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 905,
906-907. However, the importance of this power of control over the property in adjudicating a claim between the parties, when in personam jurisdiction over the defendant Is
lacking, cannot be overemphasized. Thus, for example, if in an attachment proceeding, the
attachment is void [Starkey v. Lunz, 57 Ore. 147, 110 Pac. 702 (1910)], or, If the
property ceases to exist or is exhausted prior to judgment [Coyne v. Plume, 90 Conn.
293, 97 At. 337 (1916)], then the judgment procured is itself void. So too, if jurlsdic.
tion of the court is based upon its power over the defendant's property, the judgment
of the court will have no validity beyond the amount of the property. Cooper v. Reynolds,
77 U. S. 308 (1807); see Durant v. Abendroth, 97 N. Y. 132, 141 (1884).
15. 1 BFaLE, op. cit. supra note 12; (1923) 21 MIcH. L. Rav. 938, 939. Tangible property may be attached in any state wherein it lies. Bowen v. Pope, 125 Ill. 28, 17 N. E.
64 (1888); Melhop and Klingman v. Doane and Co., 31 Iowa 397 (1871); Downer v.
Shaw, 22 N. H. 277 (1851).
16. GOODRICH, CoNLicr OF LAWS (1927) 127; (1923) 8 Coiur. L. Q. 378; 1 WHARTON,
ComLcT or LAWS (3d ed. 1905) 798; MINOR, CoNFLICr or LAWS (1901) § 125; see
(1923) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 938.
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tion in the latter.17 By reason of this dual character, the right and correlative obligation may be subject to different jurisdictions. Such divided control
obtains when the debtor and the creditor are residents of different states. More
complicated becomes the question of jurisdiction when it is recalled that garnishment of debts involves a tripartite relationship in which two rights or obligations are involved: a prinury right obtaining between the plaintiff and the defendant; and a subsidiary obligation owing from the garnishee to the defendant, which is seized by the plaintiff and diverted to satisfy the plaintiff's claim1 8
That these jurisdictional difficulties have confounded the courts is apparent
from the singular lack of harmony which prevailed among the earlier American
authorities 2 resulting in many hardships to the parties.e
In recent years, however, a new era has been unfolding which is largely traceable to the attitude of the United States Supreme Court 2' and alleviates the
injustice of the older doctrines. Despite this recent advance, New York, insofar
as possible,2 stubbornly held its ground and refused to give way2a before a
mounting weight of authority. To properly evaluate the recent New York
statute;24 which was intended to bring New York in line with the majority view,
it would seem to be advisable, at the outset, to venture an estimate of the older
New York doctrines.
IL

Tim GARNISHMENT

OF INTANGIBLE DEBTS IN NEW YoRK-.A DEEPLY

ROOTED ANACHRONi5Sm

In analyzing the so-called rule attention must be drawn to four different
factual situations: (1) when the defendant and the garnishee are both domiciled
in New York; (2) when the defendant is domiciled in New York and the gar17. 1 BE=in, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 108.1; Carpenter, supra note 14, at 912; Kennedy, The Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York (1926) 35 YA'rz L. J. 6S9, 690;
see Holmes, J., dissenting, Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 97 (1929).
18. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 691.
19. For the divergent rules which existed among many of the jurisdictions see Notes
(1893) 19 L. R. A. 577-579; (1904) 67 L. R. A. 209, 209-223; (1906) 3 L. IP. A. (.,;. s.)
608, 608-611; (1909) 20 L. R. A. (x. s.) 264-267; L. R. A. (191SF) 8S0-SSS; (1923) 27
A. L. R. 1396-1410. Thus some cases fixed the situs of a debt at the creditor's domnicile. Central Trust Co. v. Chattanooga R. & C. R. R., 68 Fed. 685 (C. C. E. D. Tenn.
1895); Green v. Farmer's and Citizen's Bank, 25 Conn. 452 (1857); Beasey v. LenoxHaldeman Co., 116 Ga. 13, 42 S. E. 385 (1902). Others fixed the debt at the debtor's
domicile. Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wis. 468, 55 N. W. 919 (1893); see Berry v. Davis, 77
Tex. 191, 194, 13 S. W. 978, 979 (1890). Contra: Kansas City, Pittsburg and Guld R. R.
v. Parker, 69 Ark. 401, 63 S. W. 996 (1901); Harvey v. Great Northern Ry., So AMinn.
405, 52 N. W. 905 (1892); Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mling, 7 Ariz. 6, 60 Pac. 720 (1900)
(holding the debt may be garnisheed wherever personal service may ba acquired over the
garnishee).
20. A eon, op. cit. supra note 16, at § 125.
21. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Deer, 200
U. S. 176 (1906); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Hosteller, 240 U. S. 620 (1916).
22. See p. 290, infra.
23. See notes 42, 43, infra.
24. See note 5, supra.
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nishee is not; (3) when the garnishee is domiciled in New York and the defendant is not; (4) when neither the defendant nor the garnishee is domiciled
in New York.
(A) When Both the Defendant and the Garnishee are Domiciled in New York.
Hereunder it has been generally conceded, without any difficulty, that
an attachment of the debt owing by the garnishee to the defendant could be
validly made.2 5 Both the parties, defendant and garnishee, were subject to the
control of the New York courts; it was therefore unnecessary to decide whether
the situs of the debt was at the defendant's or garnishee's domicile, since, under
either view, New York had ample jurisdictional power.
(B) When the Defendant is Domiciled in New York and the Garnishee is not.
In this situation, it is noteworthy that the control over the defendant is
clearly present .by virtue of his domicile within the state. The requisites of the
common law26 and of the constitutional mandate of due process 27 necessitated
personal service upon the garnishee before the attachment proceeding could be
entertained. Since the defendant would be required to obtain personal service
upon the garnishee if he were suing on the claim existing between himself and
the garnishee, 28 the plaintiff who traced his right through the defendant 20 had to
meet similar requirements. In this situation-the defendant being domiciled
within the state-New York was in accord with the established principles, for
by statutory mandate personal service upon the garnishee was a strict, but
sufficient, requisite. 30
(C) When the Garnishee is Domiciled in New York and the Defendant is not.
As a general rule, when the defendant was not domiciled within the state
it was essential that his property be attached therein, if a binding judgment was
to be obtained against him. 1 Therefore, the question arose as to when proper
25. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act (1921) §§ 916, 917; O'Brien v. Mechanics' & Traders' Fire
Insurance Co., 56 X. Y. 52 (1874); Courtney v. Eighth Ward Bank, 154 N. Y. 688, 49
N. E. 54 (1898); Amberg v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 171 N. Y. 314, 63 N. E. 1111 (1902).
26. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Reprints 546 (K. B. 1808).
27. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917).
28. Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts, in New York (1926) 35 YALE L. 3.
689, 693.
29. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 226 (1905); R. T. Davis Mill Co. v. Bangs, 6
Kan. App. 38, 40, 49 Pac. 628, 629 (1897).
30. N. Y. Crv. PRAC. Acr (1920) § 917. Such a requisite would be complied with, If
suit were brought against the defendant in the state of the garnishee's domicile [Continental Nat. Bank v. Thurber, 74 Hun 632 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1893), aff'd, 143 N. Y. 648, 37
N. E. 828 (1894)] or in the state where the garnishee is personally served with process,
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91 (1917); Durant v. Abendroth, 97 N. Y. 132
(1884); Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Reprints 546 (K. B. 1808). However,
if the garnishee is a foreign corporation then additional proof is necessary to establish that
it has submitted to the laws of this jurisdiction. The submission may be express: Penn
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917); Comey v. United Surety Co.,
217 N. Y. 268, 111 N. E. 832 (1916); N. Y. STocx CoRP. LAw (1923) §§ 110-114; or
implied: Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U, S. 8 (1907); Tauza v. Susquehanna Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
31. See note 14, supra.
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jurisdiction was acquired over the intangible debt so as to bind a non-resident
defendant who was not personally served.
If New York had adhered to the theory that the debt to be garnished is located with the non-resident defendant, a doctrine which New York strongly supported,3 2 then the plaintiff could not have maintained his action against the
absentee defendant by the garnishment proceeding. However, when confronted with the problem, the New York court, perhaps to avoid unfortunate
consequences which would result from the application of such a doctrine, recognized the court's jurisdiction under this factual situation. Unfortunately this
result was accomplished not by accepting the fact that power of control over
the garnishee, independent of his domicile, gave the court jurisdiction s In
lieu of emphasis upon personal service on the garnishee, the courts superimposed a new fiction upon the classic one of mobilia sequunur personarn and
stated that the situs of the debt for purposes of attachment was situated at the
defendant's or garnishee's domicile-a fiction which was to lead to serious
discomfiture when the element of domicile was wholly absent. Thus in the
case of Douglass v. Phenix Insurance Co.,34 the Court said: .. . . the situs of
debts and obligations is at the domicile of the creditor. But the attachment
laws of our own and of other states recognize the right of a creditor of a nonresident to attach a debt or credit owing or due to him by a person within the
jurisdiction where the attachment issues, and to this extent the principle has
been sanctioned that the laws of a state, for the purposes of attachment proceedings, may fix the situs of a debt at the domicile of the debtor."33
(D) When Neither the Defendant nor the Garnisheeis Domiciled in Ncw York.
Hereunder, the fictions doctrine of the New York courts centering
around domicile broke down and its shortcomings became apparent. A review
of the prevailing American rule discloses the vice of its position. In the leading case of Harris v. Balk,36 the problem of ascertaining the power of a court
to garnish a debt arising between non-residents was definitely solved. Correctly recognizing the fact that the essential jurisdictional ingredient in attachment actions must be power of control over the defendant's property, the court
in this case said that since the obligation of the debtor-garnishee follows and
clings to him wherever he goes, 37 so the debt itself may be said to be present
wherever personal jurisdiction could be acquired over the garnishee. Thus
for attachment purposes the debt was said to follow the person of the garnishee, and the mere fact that both the defendant and the garnishee are nonresidents of the state wherein the proceeding is instituted is immaterial.33
32.
33.
34.

See p. 289.
Carpenter, supra note 14, 909; Kennedy, supra note 19, at 694.
138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938 (1893).

35.

138 N. Y. 209, 219, 33 N. E. 938, 940 (1893).

36.
37.

198 U. S. 215 (1905).
"All debts are payable everywhere, unless there be some special limitation or pro-

vision in respect to payment, the rule being that debts as such have no locus or situs,
but accompany the creditor everywhere and authorize a demand upon the debtor everywhere," 2 PARsons, Comracrs (8th ed.) 702.

38. Accord: Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176 (1906); Baltimore
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Consequently the old idea that domicile fixed the garnishment situs was discredited and the debt was recognized in fact as being a migratory entity. This
case also enunciated the important constitutional principle that all judgments
rendered in accordance with the majority rule satisfied the requirements of full
faith and of due process so as to protect the garnishee from subsequent action
by his creditor.3 9
As has been indicated, the so-called New York rule was determined in the
case of Douglass v. Phenix Insurance Co.' 4 0 prior to the adjudication of Harris
v. Balk.4 1 The former case set forth three distinct doctrines. First, it held
strictly to a fictional doctrine of its own creation, that the situs of the debt
was limited to the jurisdiction of the domicile of the defendant or that of the
garnishee. 42 Second, that just as the garnishee's domicile was the determining
jurisdictional element in attachment actions, so too the state of origin of the
43
corporate-garnishee fixed the jurisdictional forum for the foreign corporation.
& Ohio R. R. v. Hosteller, 240 U. S. 620 (1916); Stone v. Drake, 79 Ark. 384, 96 S. W.
197 (1903); Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N. J. Eq. 468, 32 AtI. 663 (1895);
Weiner v. American Ins. Co., 224 Pa. 292, 73 AtI. 443 (1909); Bristol v. Brent, 38 Utah
58, 110 Pac. 356 (1910).
39. Thus, if in accordance with a judgment properly rendered the garnishee should
pay the obligation as required by the order of the court, then he may be freed from the
risk of double liability, [cf. Ward v. Boyce, 152 N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. 180 (1897)] If
during the pendency of the proceeding proper notice is given to the defendant so that
he may defend himself against the plaintiff's action. Pierce v. Chicago Ry., 36 Wis. 283
(1874). The basis for the garnishee's liability in this event, it is suggested, is the alleged
injury to the defendant as a result of the garnishee's negligence, [(1919) 32 HArv. L. REV.
575, 5761 but such notice does not destroy the constitutionality of the garnishment proceeding as far as the rights have been adjudicated between the plaintiff and the defendant. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Hosteller, 240 U. S. 620 (1916); Southern Ry. v. Williams,
141 Tenn. 46, 206 S. W. 186 (1918). In situations where the garnishment proceeding
is sought to be brought and there is real danger thereby of the garnishee suffering double
liability, the garnishment relief would be denied by some courts. Weitzel v. Weitzel,
27 Ariz. 117, 230 Pac. 1106 (1924); Parker, Peebles and Knox v. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 111
Conn. 383, 150 Atl. 313 (1930). The holding in these cases is amply justified in as much
as a garnishee ought not to be subjected to double liability, [Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 I1. 592, 46 N. E. 641 (1897)] or placed in a worse position by the garnishment than he occupied as a debtor of the defendant. Van Camp Hardware & Iron Co.
v. Plimpton, 174 Mass. 278, 54 N. E. 538; Martin v. Nadel, L. R. (1906) 2 K. B. 26;
see Embree & Collins v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 72, 73 (N. Y. 1809).
40. 138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938 (1893).
41. 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
42. Accord: Carr v. Corcoran, 44 App. Div. 97, 60 N. Y. Supp. 763 (1st Dep't 1899);
Allen v. United Cigar Stores Co., 39 Misc. 500, 80 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1902); see
Nat. Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 179 N. Y. 213, 222-224, 71 N. E. 766, 768 (1904);
Bridges v. Wade, 113 App. Div. 350, 355-362, 99 N. Y. Supp. 126, 129-134 (1st Dep't
1906).
43. Accord: Cohn v. Enterprise Distributing Co., 214 App. Div. 238, 212 N. Y. Supp.
39 (1st Dep't 1925); Allen v. United Cigar Stores Co., 39 Misc. 500, 80 N. Y. Supp. 401
(Sup. Ct. 1902); Gerard Investing Co. v. National Rys., 243 App. Div. 294, 276 N. Y.
Supp. 1002 (1st Dep't 1935); American Dry Ice Corp. v. Delancey Chemical Corp., 155
Misc. 661, 280 N. Y. Supp. 255 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aft'd, 245 App. Div. 712 (Sup, Ct. 1935).
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Third, that all judgments rendered in defiance of any of the aforementioned
propositions were offensive to constitutional and common law requirements and
could therefore be disregarded. In recent years, the first two of these doctrines
have been substantially reaffirmed, 44 but the third has been overruled to conform with the constitutional mandate of the United States Supreme Court in
Harris v. Balk. 45 By virtue of the latter case, New York must give full faith to
judgments issued by sister states. 40
The continued adherence of many New York courts to these remaining doctrines47 of the Douglass case was subject to serious criticism by commentators
on the local law.48 As to the first of these principles, it has been noted4 9 that
there appeared to be no reason for restricting the jurisdiction of the court
to the domicile of the defendant or garnishee provided that satisfactory and direct service in personam had been accomplished upon the latter outside of
the state of his domicile. It was pointed out that New York could no longer
argue in support of its doctrine that a garnishable debt called for jurisdiction
over either the domicile of the garnishee or the defendant, or both. Moreover,
the continuance of the outmoded doctrine of domiciliary control in New York
worked a distinct hardship upon resident plaintiffs. A resident plaintiff's access
to a credit owing to a non-resident defendant from a non-resident garniseeeven when the latter was personally served within the jurisdiction-was dependent not upon the justice or injustice of the garnishment process as it affected the non-residents, one or both, but solely upon the establishment of a
mythical situs of the debt garnished at the domicile of the debtor or of the
garnishee. Thereby, the resident-plaintiff discovered that this fiction was not
only potent enough to defeat his ancillary relief against the garnishee, but was
likewise destructive of the plaintiff's jurisdiction over the defendant in the
main action. Even from the standpoint of justice and expediency it appeared
that the courts of New York ought to have favored procedural remedies and
construed them liberally, especially when they were employed by resident plaintiffs against delinquent non-resident defendants. 0
44. See notes 42, 43, supra. However the garnishment remedy was allowed when the
debt sought to be attached arose out of a contract made and payable in New York [Lancaster v. Spotswood, 41 Misc. 19, 83 N. Y. Supp. 572 (Sup. Ct. 1903)], or if it arose out
of the business of the garnishee carried on within the state [India Rubber Co. v. Katz, 65
App. Div. 349, 72 N. Y. Supp. 658 (1st Dep't 1901)], or from a contract to be performed
within the state [Flynn v. White, 122 App. Div. 780, 107 N. Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dep't
1907)]. But see, Burlington & M. R. R. v. Thompson, 31 Ran. 180, 192, 1 Pac. 622, 623
365, 366 (1876); Morgan v. NeMTille, 74 Pa.
(1884); MHineral Point R. R. v. Barron, 83 Ill.
52, 56-57 (1873). These cases hold that the kx loci is applied when determining the parties'
rights and not when ascertaining the plaintiff's remedies.
45. 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
46. Cf. Drake v. DeSilva, 124 App. Div. 95, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1039 (1st Dep't 1903).
47. See notes 42, 43, supra.
48. See note 58, infra.
49. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 697-698.

50. See note 9, supra. The injustice of the resulting deprivation becomes still more
forceful when it is noted that the New York Court of Appeals has specifically am-serted
that "The Courts of this state were primarily for the residents of this state . . .Y; and
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The second conclusion of the Douglass case-that a foreign corporation
could not be a garnishee in an attachment action-likewise appears to be without sufficient basis. Clearly this proposition was derived from the old classic
concept that a corporation could have no domicile or presence apart from the
state of its origin. 51 However, in spirit this doctrine has been repudiated
both within5 2 and without 53 of New York, for in recent years the influence
and activity of the corporate life have reached far beyond the borders of chartering states and very potently penetrated the affairs and activities of foreign
jurisdictions."4 Since the attachment statutes of this state were broadly worded, 55 New York should have abandoned such a time-wor fiction long ago.
Finally since the United States Supreme Court has determined that all
judgments procured in accordance with the majority rule are protected by the
full faith and credit clause, 55 New York's insistence upon adhering to its older
doctrine with respect to actions instituted within the state thereby placed its
business interests in a prejudicial position in comparison with other jurisdictions." For under the New York rule, whereas local debtors might be subjected to decrees of foreign courts following personal service alone within the
foreign state, local creditors,in order to bring effective garnishment proceedings,
were required to establish that the domicile of the defendant or of the garnishee was in New York.
that "There must be some forceful and controlling reason entering into the very nature and
essence of the action which would close their doors to its own citizens. . . ." Gregonis v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 159, 139 N. E. 223, 225 (1923).
The court also admitted that the locality selected for the presence of the debt varies, but
"At the root of the selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the requirements of
justice and convenience in particular conditions. . . ." Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London &
Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N. Y. 120, 123, 174 N. E. 299, 300 (1931).
51. Peckham v. North Parish, 33 Mass. 274 (1834); Middlebrooks v. Springfield Fire
Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 301 (1841); see Matter of McQueen v. Middleton Manufacturing Co.,
16 Johns. 5, 6 (N. Y. 1819). For the reason for this doctrine, see Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U. S. 517, 588 (1839).
52. See Martine v. International Life Ins. Soc., 53 N. Y. 339, 344-348 (1873); Morgan
v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. 447, 453-459, 82 N. E. 438, 440-442 (1907); Comey
v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 273-277, 111 N. E. 832, 833-835 (1916). See also
generally, Rothschild, A Strange Instance of Procedural Self-Denial (1935) 10 ST. JoUN's
L. REV. 26; Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, (1936) 5
FoRDHAm L. REV. 272, 286-300.
53. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882); Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins.
Co., 25 N. J. L. 57 (1855); Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 S. R. 173 (Pa. 1827).
54. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882); See Br=, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 88.1.
55. Under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1920) §§ 916, 917 merely personal service was required upon the garnishee and no requirement such as local domicile within the jurisdiction was present. People v. St. Nichols Bank, 44 App. Div. 313, 60 N. Y. Supp. 719
(1st Dep't 1902); Weil v. Gallun, 75 App. Div. 313, 78 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1st Dep't 1903);
see Kennedy, supra note 28, at 689-699.
56. See note 39, supra.
57. See Saxe, Review of Laws Sponsored by the Judczial Council for 1936, N. Y. B. A.
BuLL. (Sept. 1936) pp. 197-198; Explanatory Note of Judicial Council on the Ancndment
to § 916 of N. Y. C. P. A. (1936); Rothschild, infra note 58; Kennedy, supra note 28,
at 704.
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COMECTIVE CONSEQUENCES

Despite frequent criticism,58 the doctrines of the Douglass case prevailed in
this jurisdiction for many years before a conclusive step was taken by the LegislatureY9 Although it must be conceded that since the rendition of Harris v.
Balk,6 0 no case has been decided on the problem of garnishment jurisdiction
by the New York Court of Appeals, nevertheless a persistent application of
the doctrine of stare decisis over a period of years by lower appellate courts
had served to ingrain more deeply the doctrines of a bygone day into the law
of this state.61 The New York Judicial Council, keenly aware of the procedural obstacles which prevented the problem from ever coming before the New
York Court of Appeals, suggested the legislative remedy which has now become
law.62 This alteration has been accomplished by adding the following provision to the section of the New York Civil Practice Act devoted to an explanation of the types of intangibles subject to attachment. The provision reads as
follows:
"Within the meaning of this section [regarding garnishment] there shall be
included any indebtedness due or to become due from a non-resident or a foreign
corporation, upon whom or which service of process may be made within this
state, to any person whether a non-resident or a foreign corporation."'6
As a result of this amendment, it is believed that the law of this jurisdiction
has been properly brought into conformity with the majority rule, so that the
attachment-of intangible debts is now possible in New York when either or both
the garnishee and the defendant are non-residents and the garnishee has been
personally served with process in the jurisdiction-and this is so whether the
garnishee be a natural person or a foreign corporation.
Clearly the amendment embodies the proposals of the many commentators on
the older New York law.0 4 However, since the statute herein considered is limited to the provisional remedy of garnishment by creditors prior to judgment,
attention must be drawn to the restricted rights afforded to judgment-creditors
58. Kennedy, Jurisdictionover Debts, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 21, 1925, p. 162, coL 1; Kennedy,
Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York (1926) 35 Y r.n L. J. 689; Rothschild, A
Strange Instance of ProceduralSelf-Denial (1935) 10 ST. Jomes L. REv. 26.

59. See note 5, supra.
60. 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
61. See Rothschild, supra note 58, at 26.
62. New York Judicial Council, Explanatory Note on the Proposed Amendmcnt to
IN. Y. C. P. A. § 916 (1936). With regard to these procedural difficulties the Judicial
Council said: "Because of procedural difficulties the Court of Appeals will in all lie.ihood
never be able to review this question (American Dry Ice Corp. v. Delancey Chemical
Corp., 155 Misc. 661, aff'd 243 A. D. 702, leave to appeal denied, - N. Y. -. It Vould
seem that the question can only arise on a motion to vacate the warrant of attachment
and an order entered on the application for such provisional remedy is not a final order
and therefore not subject to review by the Court of Appeals (Mitchell v. Northwestern

Ohio Savings Assn., 236 N. Y. 668)." See also Rothschild, supra note 58, in this regard.
63. See note 5, supra.
64. See note 58, supra.
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seeking satisfaction of their claims out of intangible property of delinquent
debtors after judgment. In this latter situation, the New York Civil Practice
Act contains a remedy for judgment-creditors who may elect to levy execution
upon the intangibles of delinquent judgment-debtors-a proceeding designated
as garnishee execution. 65 Unlike the garnishment remedy employed by attaching creditors, this proceeding presupposes the existence of a judgment;
nevertheless since it is directed to the satisfaction of a claim out of property,
the courts have held that the jurisdictional res must be situated within the
forum before this form of execution is available. Thus when faced with the
problem of ascertaining where the intangible debts of judgment-debtors were
situated for jurisdictional purposes, an analogy was drawn between the garnishment remedy provided for under the attachment statute, and that of
garnishee execution. Thereafter the court concluded that the situs of debts for
garnishee execution purposes was located at the domicile of the garnishee.00
In spite of the recent statutory changes made in the field of garnishment prior
to judgment, the doctrine pertaining to garnishment after judgment remains
unaffected, so that the position of creditors in an attachment action is superior
to that of judgment-creditors pursuing the garnishee . execution remedy.
Whereas the attaching creditor under the new statute is required to show that
the garnishee has been subjected to personal service within the jurisdiction, 67 in the garnishee execution action, the garnishee must in addition be domiciled within the state. The injustice of such a condition is especially unfortunate when it is noted that attaching plaintiffs may be dependent
upon the attachment of the property itself in order to establish the jurisdiction
of the court in the main and ancillary actions.0 8 On the other hand, before
bringing the garnishee execution proceeding, the judgment-creditor has already
usually achieved a personal judgment against the defendant.0, Despite the
admitted jurisdiction over the defendant terminating in a valid judgment, the
plaintiff finds himself in an inferior position compared with plaintiffs in garnishment before judgment. Consequently it would seem that the legislature ought
to revise the New York Civil Practice Act Section 684, which is concerned with
the garnishee execution remedy, so as to bring the advantages now available
to attaching plaintiffs to those seeking relief subsequent to judgment.
65. By this proceeding, a judgment creditor is authorized to deny execution on his
debtor's wages, debts, earnings, salary, income from trust funds or profits, due or to become due to the judgment debtor, in the hands of a third person. N. Y. Crv. PRAC. AcT
(1936) § 684. For rules applicable thereto, see 5 CAmODyo, N. Y. PRACTICE (1933) § 1708
et seq.
66. Morris Plan Co. v. Miller, 102 Misc. 470, 169 N. Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1918). And
this is so in spite of the fact that the defendant is a resident of New York. Penrose &
McEniry v. Manogue, 129 Misc. 512, 221 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sup. Ct. 1927); see Newman &
Kaufman, The New York Garnishee Execution as a Practical Remedy (1935) 12 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 255, 265-266.
67. See p. 293, supra.
68. See note 14, supra.
69. N. Y. Civ. PRac. Acr (1936) § 684.
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CONCLUSION

Typical of the work accomplished since its inception," ° the New York Judicial
Council is to be congratulated for the part it played in so revising the garnishment laws of this State as to serve better the necessities of our modern age
and life. By the enactment under consideration, it is believed that New York
has fallen squarely into line with the great weight of authority which today
recognizes the transient qualities of intangible debts for attachment purposes.
The rule, which held that foreign corporations could not be garnishees in attachment actions, has been uprooted by the statutory amendment which permits a levy upon "... . any indebtedness due or to become due.., from a foreign
corporation upon... which service of process may be made within the jurisdiction." 71 Consequently the task which confronted the legislature would appear to be thoroughly accomplished as far as garnishment prior to judgment is
concerned. The present New York rule specifically meets the necessities of
both convenience and justice by increasing the utility of the remedy of garnishment and by adequately protecting the rights of creditor, debtor and garnishee.
70. See note 2, supra.
71. N. Y. Civ. PzRe. Acr (1936) § 916.

